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JOHN B. LEONIS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Contempt--Process.-It is proper to deny a motion to set aside 
a contempt judgment as to one of several city councilmen on 
the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over 
his person where, although he was not served with a copy of 
the affidavit charging contempt, refused to sign and verify 
the answering affidavit, and failed to appear personally at 
the contempt proceeding, there is evidence that he knew that 
the attorney appearing at such proceeding believed that he 
was employed to represent him and the other councilmen; 
that when the attorney, who had advised him of the institu-
tion and progress of the proceeding, requested him to sign 
and verify the .answer he gave no reason for a refusal to do 
so other than that he was sick and under the care of a 
physician; and that he did not disavow the attorney's repre-
sentation or authority until after the citees were found guilty. 
[2] Id.-Appearance.-Code Civ. Proc., § 416, aeclaring that "The 
voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to personal 
service of the summons and copy of the complaint upon him," 
applies to civil actions, and does not control in contempt pro-
ceedings which, according to their position in Code Civ. Proc., 
pt. III, would seem to be "Special Proceedings of a Civil 
Nature," but which, by reason of their inherent aspects, have 
been held to be "special proceedings of a criminal character." 
[3] Id.-Appearance.-Although Code Civ. Proc. § 416, declaring 
that "The voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent 
to personal service ... upon him," is not controlling in a 
contempt proceeding, the principle of the section is applicable 
when a contemnor appears by counsel and defends on the 
merits. 
[4] !d.-Certiorari-Grounds for Annulment of Judgment.-Al-
though petitioner seeking review of a judgment holding him 
in contempt of court for failure to comply with a mandatory 
injunction presents certificate of city clerk showing that his 
term of office as city councilman expired while the proceeding 
for review has been pending, the portion. of the contempt 
commitment which requires his imprisonment until he, as 
city councilman, complies with the injunction will not be 
annulled, since this does not go to the validity of the con-
tempt judgment as of the time it was rendered. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 39; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 69. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contempt, §50; [2, 3] Contempt, 
§ 53; [ 4] Contempt, § 81. 
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PROCEEDING to review a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County holding petitioner in contempt of 
court, and an order refusing to set aside the judgment. 
Joseph W. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed. 
Edward R. Young, John F. O'Hara, John W. Shenk, III, 
and E. L. Searle for Petitioner. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, 
and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-John B. Leonis was one of the councilmen 
of the city of Vernon who were found guilty of contempt in 
the proceeding reviewed in City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 
ante, p. 509 [241 P.2d 243]. After the judgment of con-
tempt was rendered he appeared specially by counsel E. L. 
Searle and moved to set aside the contempt judgment as 
to him on the ground that the trial court had not acquired 
jurisdiction over his person. The trial court denied this 
motion. By petition for review I.eonis now attacks both 
the order denying his motion and the contempt judgment. 
We have concluded that the order and judgment are valid. 
The order. to show cause in the contempt proceeding was 
issued on December 5, 1949; it directed tht'!It a copy of the 
affidavit charging contempt and a copy of the order be served 
on the councilmen at least five days before the date set for 
hearing. Leonis was not served within the prescribed time 
or at all. He did not conceal himself to avoid service. He 
refused to sign and verify the answering affidavit, which was 
signed and verified by the four other councilmen. He never 
appeared personally at the contempt proceeding. Respondent 
court held that it nevertheless had jurisdiction to find Leonis 
in contempt because he authorized Attorney Edward R. 
Young (who also represented Vern on and the four other 
councilmen) to, and Mr. Young did, appear for him in the 
contempt proceeding. I..eonis disputes Young's authority 
and the facts upon which the trial court resolved the issue 
are therefore pertinent. 
On December 6, 1949, a deputy city clerk of Vern on tele-
phoned Mr. Young and told him that the affidavit and order 
to show cause had been served on Vern on and the members 
of the city council and that the members of the city council 
had asked Mr. Young to represent them and the city in the 
contempt proceeding. Mr. Leonis had attended no meetings 
of the city council since January 3, 1949, and had been on 
leave of absence from the council since February 15, 1949, 
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and there is no direct evidence that he authorized the other 
members of the council to employ Mr. Young on his behalf. 
'l'here is evidence that Leonis knew that Mr. Young believed 
that he was employed to represent Leonis as well as the other 
Vernon council members; that he knew that Mr. Young, pur-
suant to his belief, was appearing in behalf of Leonis as well 
as the others, and that with such knowledge Leonis remained 
silent and did not disavow such representation, or Young's 
authority, until after the citees had been found guilty. 
On December 28, 1949, Mr. Young informed the court and 
opposing counsel that he appeared on behalf of Mr. Leonis; 
that because of illness Leonis would not be present at the 
contempt hearing; and that it would not be necessary to serve 
him. On January 5, 1950, Mr. Young caused the answer 
which he had prepared, and which contained lines for the 
signatures of all five members of the city council, to be signed 
and verified by the four members other than Leonis. As stated, 
Leonis refused to sign and verify the answer. 
The contempt proceeding was heard and on January 12 
the court found all the citees guilty of contempt. It set 
January 16 as the date for pronouncing sentence and told 
Young· that Leonis should be present at that time. Mr. Young 
said, ''I will do the best I can, your Honor. I cannot do it 
if he >von 't come. I can't carry him,'' and the court replied, 
''If he wqn 't come we will then have to take such steps as 
the law provides for requiring his appearance here in court. 
He should be here at the time sentence is imposed if possible.'' 
On ,January 16 Mr. Young advised the court that Leonis had 
told him that because of his physical condition he could not 
be present; the court then pronounced sentence. 
On January 17, five days after the conclusion of the hear-
ing and after the citees had been found guilty, Mr. Leonis 
wrote to Mr. Young that Young was not to represent him 
in any capacity in the proceeding. On January 24 the judg-
ment of contempt was signed and entered. On January 26 
the special appearance through new counsel and notice of 
motion to set aside the judgment as to Leonis were filed. 
Mr. Young had represented Mr. J...~eonis, the other mem-
bers of the city council and Vern on in the injunction pro-
ceedings, and had been Leon is' personal attorney for 20 years. 
Never before had Young appeared for Leonis or filed a plead-
ing for him without having been given express authority. 
Mr. Young did not request, but believed he had been given, 
authority to represent I.Jeonis in the contempt proceeding. 
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Affidavits of Mr. Young and Mr. Leonis are somewhat in 
conflict as to whether Young fully advised Leonis of the 
pending· contempt proceeding and as to whether Leonis in-
structed Young not to file the answer on Leonis' behalf. On 
the hearing of the motion to set aside the contempt judg-
ment the trial court read these affidavits and concluded that 
"It is perfectly apparent that he [Mr. Leon is] knew that 
Mr. Young was representing him and purported to represent 
him. At no time, the Court is satisfied, did he say to Mr. 
Young or indicate to Mr. Young that Mr. Young was not 
to represent him in this proceeding; not to compile any docu-
ments .... It is true that by itself the fact that Mr. Young 
was the attorney of record for the defendant in the main 
case did not give him, according to this Court's opinion, the 
authority to represent and file an appearance on behalf of 
Mr. Leonis in this contempt proceeding .... He did that 
which he had every reason to believe he was justified in doing 
and was proceeding for th)'l benefit of this contemner as 
well as the other contemners in the proceeding.'' 
[1] The above related conclusions of the trial court are 
amply supported by the record, only brief excerpts from 
which need be mentioned. The trial court was entitled to 
believe the averments of Mr. Young that he advised Leonis 
of the institution and progress of the contempt proceeding, 
that he further ''advised said John B. Leonis that in his 
[Young's] opinion it would be unnecessary for him [Leonis] 
to appear as long as he was represented by counsel''; that 
r~eonis did not forbid Mr. Young to file the answer; that 
he (Young) requested r_,eonis to sign and verify the answer 
and that Leonis ''then informed affiant [Young] that he 
was sick and under the care of his physician and that he 
would not sign said answer, giving no other reason than 
that he was sick and was under the care of his physician." 
T_jeonis' conduct seems to have been calculated to encourage 
Mr. Young to represent him and to take full advantage of 
Mr. Young's services in the event that success attended them 
but to disavow them in the event of loss. There is no room for 
doubt that Leonis was fully informed as to the pendency 
and nature of the proceedings and as to Mr. Young's appear-
ance in good faith for him. In the circumstances Leonis, 
if he were not to be bound, should have expressly directed 
Young· not to enter his appearance or represent him; instead 
hP refrained from any such suggestion, knowing that Young 
believed he had authority and was proceeding on that belief. 
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There is no question as to the complete good faith of Mr. 
Young, and the que:'ltion of his authority, insofar as it ap-
pears to be one of fact, has been determined against Leonis 
and is fully supported by the evidence. 
There is a further question whether personal service on 
Leonis was a jurisdictional requirement which could not be 
waived by I1eonis' appearance through counsel and defense 
on the merits. [2] For the purpose of jurisdiction in a 
civil action ''The voluntary appearance of a defendant is 
equivalent to personal service of the summons and copy of 
the complaint upon him." (Code Civ. Pro c., § 416.) Sec-
tion 416 does not control in contempt proceedings, which, 
according to their position in the code (Title III of the Code 
of Civil Procedure), would seem to be ''Special Proceedings 
of a Civil Nature," but which, by reason of their inherent 
aspects, have been held to be ''special proceedings of a crim-
inal character" (Bridges v. Supe1·ior Court (1939), 14 Cal. 
2d 464, 4 77 [ 94 P .2d 983], reversed on other grounds, 314 
U.S. 252 [62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192]). [3] No good reason 
appears why the principle and purpose enunciated in section 
416 for civil actions should not be applied here. This view 
is supported by Foley v. Foley (1898), 120 Cal. 33, 39 [52 
P. 122, 65 Am.St.Rep. 147], where the contemnor contended 
that he could not be punished for contempt because he was 
not served personally. The court pointed out that he "ap-
peared by his counsel in answer to the order to show cause, 
and submitted evidence upon the merits of the application, 
and resisted the same without objection to the want of per-
sonal service,'' and said, ''This of itself was sufficient to 
give the court jurisdiction over him.'' We apply that prin-
ciple here. (It is noted that the decision in the Foley case 
went in favor of the contemnor on other grounds.) 
[ 4] Petitioner presents a certificate of the city clerk of 
Vernon which shows that his term of office expired while 
this proceeding to review the contempt commitment has been 
pending. Therefore, he says, the portion of the commitment 
which requires his imprisonment until he, as city council-
man, complies with the injunction should be annulled. This 
is a matter to be presented to the trial court; it is to be 
presumed that proper action there will ensue ; it does not 
go to the validity of the contempt judgment as of the time 
it was rendered, which is the matter subject to review. 
The remaining contentions of petitioner are answered ad-
versely to him by our decisions in City of Vernon v. Superior 
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Court, ante, p. 509 [241 P.2d 243] and C1'ty of Ctdver City v. 
Superim· Court, post, p. 535 [241 P.2d 258]. 
For the reasons above stated the order and judgment are 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J. 
pro tern., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the judgment affirming the 
order denying the motion to set aside the judgment of 
contempt. Also, for the reasons stated in my concurring and 
dissenting opinion in City of V e1·non v. Superior Court, ante, 
p. 520 [241 P.2d 243], I join in the conclusion that the 
petitioner was guilty of contempt. However, aside from any 
question arising from the change in the petitioner's official 
status, I believe that, while still a member of the city council, 
he made all ''arrangements'' required by the injunction, 
although not within the time prescribed by it. 
I would, therefore, modify the judgment by striking there-
from the order of continuing imprisonment. 
CAR'rER, J.-I dissent. 
I adopt that portion of the opmwn of the District Court 
of Appeal, Second District, Division One, which refers to 
the lack of service on John B. Leonis, as part of my dissent 
in this case. 
''It appears as recited in the petition for writ of review, 
that John B. Leonis, a member of the City Council of Vernon, 
had been seriously ill for some two years, had not attended 
any meetings of the Council since January 3, 1949, and 
had been on a leave of absence because of such illness. The 
contempt order to show cause was issued on December 5, 
1949, and ordered Leonis and the other citees to appear before 
Judge Vickers on January 3, 1950. This order required 
that 'a copy of said Affidavit and of this Order be served 
upon the person specifically named . . . at least five days 
before the date of said hearing.' It is conceded that there 
was no such service on the petitioner Leonis at any time. 
''According to the respondent's brief, 'On December 28, 
1949, there was a conference in the chambers of the judge 
(Vickers) .... It was then reported that all persons except 
John B. Leonis had been served. Thereupon, Edward R. 
Young stipulated that he was authorized to represent John 
B. Leonis and that it would not be necessary to make service 
upon him and that he would appear for the said John B. 
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Leonis ... without the necessity of serving him .... ' At-
torney Young 'also stated to the court that he would have 
John B. J_~eonis present in the court on January 3, 1950, un-
less the physical condition of John B. Leonis was such that 
he could not be present.' Petitioner did not attend the trial 
held on January lOth and 11th, 1950, at which time Leonis 
and the other defendants were found guilty of contempt. 
"On January 5, 1950, Attorney Edward R. Young, repre-
senting the city of Vernon, caused to be presented to peti-
tioner Leonis an answer for the latter's signature. Leonis 
twice refused to sign the answer; nevertheless Attorney Young 
filed said answer in behalf of Leonis, the other four council-
men having signed it. Affidavits and counteraffidavits appear 
of record in reference to the attorney's authority to appear 
for petitioner; Mr. Young stated to the court, however, 'I 
will admit I never requested authority.' In reference to this 
matter respondent's brief lays some stress on the fact, com-
mented on by Judge Vickers, that 'Mr. Young had repre-
sented Mr. Leonis as a member of the City Council for some 
several years.' The affidavits are in conflict as to whether 
Attorney Young was definitely instructed not to represent 
the petitioner. 
"After the judgment of contempt was entered on J anu-
ary 11, 1950, a registered letter dated January 17, 1950, was 
sent by Leonis to Attorney Young instructing the latter not 
to represent petitioner in any capacity. To this Young re-
sponded by a letter advising Leonis of the judgment of con-
tempt 'of which I have already advised you by telephone.' 
On January 26, 1950, petitioner filed a notice of special ap-
pearance and motion to vacate the contempt judgment, which 
motion was denied, the trial judge expressing disbelief in 
the assertions contained in petitioner's affidavit. 
"It can hardly be questioned that a judgment imposing 
a jail ;;;entence and fine for alleged contempt of court must 
be preceded by the certain preliminary steps in due com-
pliance with law, and with proper consideration for the rights 
of the accused person. Whatever academic distinctions may 
be attempted between the criminal and civil aspects of con-
tempt proceeding-s in general, the present proceeding in 
its practical application is essentially criminal or at the least 
quasi-criminal in nature. 
"The well known constitutional guarantees of due process 
are particularly applicable and cannot be dispensed with. 
Certainly in this respect there can be no difference whether 
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the defendant is charged as a private individual or, as in 
the present case, for alleged dereliction as a member of a 
city council. In any and all cases such a defendant is en-
titled to stand upon the constitutional guarantees and to 
insist upon compliance with the law in reference to service 
of process and representation in court. Such matters are too 
serious and too far reaching in effect to justify cursory treat-
ment. The validity of such a judgment must not depend 
upon supposition or conjecture. 
''In the instant case it is conceded that John B. Leonis 
was not served with the order to show cause in re contempt, 
although, as noted in petitioner's brief, 'there is no conten-
tion that Mr. Leonis was either concealing himself to avoid 
service ... nor that Mr. Leonis was not a resident of Cali-
fornia.' Petitioner was indeed, as stated to the court by 
Attorney Young, sick at home, and would 'have to be brought 
up in a wheel chair ... his physical condition is such that 
it makes it very difficult for him to get around, not only by 
reason of having had a leg amputated, but also because of age.' 
Petitioner could hardly have accepted service of process even 
if so inclined. 
''Since the first and fundamental step of service of proc-
ess as required by the order to show cause was entirely 
omitted, it then became incumbent on the trial court to be 
assured of personal jurisdiction over this particular defend-
ant before proceeding to pronounce a judgment imposing 
fine and imprisonment. This was not done. All that was 
done towards this end, according to the record, was to ac-
cept an attorney's oral 'stipulation' that petitioner along 
with other defendants was represented by such attorney, 
and that it would therefore not be necessary to serve petitioner. 
In this connection it may be noted that petitioner's asso-
ciates, the other four councilmen, had been served with proc-
ess. No explanation as to why John B. Leonis was not 
also served as specifically required by the order, has been 
offr"red. '' 
Insofar as the merits of the case are concerned, I feel 
that aside from the lack of service of process so far as Mr. 
Leonis is concerned, the judgment of contempt should be 
annulled for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in 
City of Vernon v. S~t.perior Cmtr't, ante, p. 522. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the application 
should be granted. 
